New Perspectives on Gender and Emotion

Kaitlin T. McCormick, Heather J. MacArthur, Stephanie A. Shields, and Elaine C. Dicicco

What does it mean to be emotional? And how might perceptions of emotionality be gendered? Western cultural stereotypes consistently depict women as being more emotional than men (e.g., Fischer, 1993), and for women, this judgment often means being stereotyped as irrational. Even for women in positions of societal power, arguments and viewpoints may be cast as mere emotionality. For instance, in April of 2014, Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Dianne Feinstein encouraged the declassification of a report on CIA interrogation techniques (torture). After reviewing the evidence, Feinstein concluded the torture report should be declassified to "ensure that an un-American, brutal program of detention and interrogation w[ould] never again be considered or permitted." In response, Former CIA and National Security Agency director Michael Hayden reduced Feinstein's verdict to mere emotionality, stating, "That sentence—that motivation for the report—may show deep, emotional feeling on the part of the senator, but I don't think it leads you to an objective report" (Blake & O'Keefe, 2014). Common instances such as this one show that perceptions of emotion are gendered, and that emotion stereotypes can be used to maintain gendered power relationships.

In this chapter, we discuss the importance of considering systems of power when conducting research on gender and emotion. We argue that two themes, namely intersectionality of social identities and hierarchies of power and status, provide the way forward for research on gender and emotion. First, however, we take a step back and summarize where investigation of the links between gender and emotion have brought us so far. Then, after discussing the research potential of

K.T. McCormick (✉) • H.J. MacArthur • S.A. Shields • E.C. Dicicco
The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA
e-mail: ktm149@psu.edu; hjm158@psu.edu; sashields@psu.edu; ecd5091@psu.edu

intersectionality and power, we offer some concluding thoughts on other promising research strategies and methods that could advance the study of gender and emotion.

Emotion. Gender. Gendered Emotion

Research on emotion[1], as a field of study, has flourished and grown dramatically over the past 30 years. The current state of the psychology of emotion followed what emotion researchers sometimes refer to as the "Dark Ages" of emotion research, a period when American psychology was dominated by behaviorism and a rejection of the "mind" as an object of scientific study. With the pioneering work of scientists interested in facial expression of emotion (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 1971) and innovations in theory (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Plutchik & Kellerman, 1980), a broadly interdisciplinary study of emotion has grown significantly from the early 1980s to the present.

Among the exciting developments in the psychology of emotion in recent years is a move from thinking of emotion as a private, internal state contained by the body to an approach that considers emotion a product of actual or imagined interaction with the environment, particularly other people. For example, Saarni, Campos, Camras, and Witherington (2006, p. 227) defined emotion in functional and relational terms, as "the person's attempt or readiness to establish, maintain, or change the relation between the person and her or his changing circumstances, on matters of significance to that person." Moreover, the importance of the social context has become increasingly central to discussions of emotion, particularly as emotion emerges in the individual's relation to and interaction with others or the social environment (e.g., Van Kleef, 2009).

The shift in emotion research parallels an earlier shift in the study of gender. The study of gender in psychology in the early 1980s, for the most part, considered gender a dimension of personality. By the late 1980s, gender's systematic connection to status and power was beginning to shake things up (e.g. Deaux & Major, 1987; Eagly, 1987; West & Zimmerman, 1987, to name the most widely recognized). This shift has led to a transformation of how gender scholars, particularly those who take an interdisciplinary or cross-disciplinary approach, frame inquiry into when, why, and how gender operates. This is a transformation in how gender is

---

[1] A good brief definition of emotion is that emotions are "episodic, relatively short-term, biologically-based patterns of perception, experience, physiology, action, and communication that occur in response to specific physical and social challenges and opportunities" (Keltner & Gross, 1999, p. 468). Emotion researchers typically differentiate *emotion* from *mood* and *affect*. Mood is regarded as a type of general emotional background that is not specifically about an identifiable situation or person. Whereas emotions are about something or someone, moods are not. *Affect* is a general positive or negative hedonic state with reference to self. Affect is often unconscious, representing automatic evaluations of the world as positive or negative.

viewed, moving toward understanding gender in interpersonal terms, rather than solely as an intrapersonal trait. The most innovative work on gender today is likely to consider gender as a system of power relations (a consideration that is relatively new in the psychology of emotion). In this chapter, we are explicitly concerned with gender as a classification system that influences access to power and resources and shapes the relations among women and men (Crawford, 2011).

Our perspective on the topics of gender and emotion is social constructivist and views bodily and social dimensions of emotion as mutually influencing one another. In other words, we acknowledge the "built-in" aspect of emotion shared with other primates, such as responsiveness to some emotion elicitors (e.g., fight or flight response) and certain expressive tendencies, while we critically interrogate the "built" or sociocultural aspects of emotion, such as the language we use to talk about emotion and representations of emotion in beliefs, values, and institutions (e.g., Shields, 2002).

So, has the study of gender in emotion benefitted from these massive changes in both the psychology of emotion and the psychology of gender? Yes and no.

First, the no. As in other areas of psychology, the first level of inquiry in research on gender and emotion typically takes the form of cataloging differences and, sometimes, similarities between women and men and girls and boys. (See Shields, 2013 for a critique of the differences approach as applied to gender and emotion.) The differences approach has yielded a fairly consistent picture of the contexts that tend to elicit gender differences (Brody & Hall, 2010; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Shields, 1991), and these are discussed below. In general, however, focusing on gender differences reinforces notions of difference as inherent and fixed, a critique many feminist researchers have made (e.g., Barnett & Rivers, 2004; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988; Hyde, 2005; Lott, 1997; Magnusson & Marecek, 2012; Unger, 2010; Yoder & Kahn, 2003). The differences approach also perpetuates stereotypes about the types of emotion that women and men express (e.g., sadness and fear for women, anger and pride for men) and about women's presumed excessive emotionality. In addition, the study of gender and emotion typically has been undertaken with little attention to within-gender variation, and only recently have some investigators begun to think about the links between gender and emotion in intersectional terms (e.g., Smith, LaFrance, & Dovidio, 2015). We have more to say about this later in our chapter.

Now, the yes. The study of gender and emotion has benefitted from the evolution of the psychology of emotion and the psychology of gender primarily by acquiring from them an appreciation of how social context moderates gender effects. In general, moderators that affect the degree of gender-related difference in emotional behavior are the same as those that affect the degree and direction of difference in other areas of gendered behavior. Moderators tested in experimental studies include, among others, the timing and scope of self-report, whether research participants believe their behavior is being evaluated by others, and manipulation of participant motivation.

By considering the contexts that exaggerate or attenuate gender differences, we can more clearly focus on *when* and *how* gender matters. We summarize some of this research before considering future prospects for the field.

Gender Matters Depending on the Timing and Scope of Self-Report

One difficulty that arises for researchers studying emotion is that personal emotional experiences can only be measured using some form of self-report. The timing and scope of these reports influence the extent to which gender differences are found. When people are asked to describe past emotion experiences, describe what generally happens, or give a global self-evaluation, self-reports more closely resemble gender-emotion stereotypes (e.g., Barrett, Robin, Pietromonaco, & Eyssell, 1998; Grossman & Wood, 1993; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Robinson & Clore, 2002; Shields, 1991). On the other hand, when women and men are asked to report their felt emotion close to the time that the emotion occurs, as in emotion diaries (e.g., Barrett et al., 1998; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; McFarland, Ross, & DeCourville, 1989; Oatley & Duncan, 1994; Robinson & Clore, 2002; Shields, 1991), and/or respond to specific questions about the experience, differences tend to be smaller or absent.

To illustrate further, Robinson, Johnson, and Shields (1998) found that when participants in a competitive game reported their emotional experiences a week after the game, their self-reports followed gender stereotypes, but stereotypes were not evident when self-reports were obtained immediately following game play. Similarly, when asked to imagine the emotional experience of a hypothetical player, other participants relied on gender stereotypes, but they did not rely on these stereotypes when rating players they had actually observed play the game. Thus, there is evidence that gender-emotion stereotypes act as heuristics, influencing people's self-reports about their experience when questions are framed generally, and when emotional behavior is reported some time after the emotion event.

Gender Matters When the Behavior Occurs in a Socially Evaluative Context

Gendered emotion norms for appropriate and socially desired behavior can influence emotion expression in both women and men. When emotion behaviors are performed in a context where people's behavior is likely to be observed or evaluated by real or hypothetical others, gender differences in emotion are more pronounced. People may act in gender appropriate ways in hopes of being positively evaluated by others, especially when unsure of how to act (Deaux & Major, 1987).

One example of a gendered emotion norm in North America is the expectation that women should smile in a wide range of social situations, whereas expectations for men's smiling are more limited. In a meta-analysis of studies reporting gender differences in smiling, LaFrance, Hecht, and Paluck (2003) found differences between women and men were greatest when participants were aware they were being observed, when they were alone and imaging interacting with another person, and when people interacted with unfamiliar rather than familiar others. When women and men felt they were being evaluated, women smiled more and men smiled less, in line with gender-emotion appropriateness norms.

Additionally, certain kinds of evaluative settings make gender particularly salient and therefore magnify gender's role in emotion performance. When interacting with unfamiliar others, people are likely to assume that their emotions will be evaluated. Barrett et al. (1998) found that when participants interacted with a partner of the other gender, they reported experiencing and expressing more emotion than when they interacted with a same gender partner. The authors suggested given the high likelihood that many of the participants were heterosexual, romantic undertones may have affected emotion between mixed gender pairs. This difference in emotion reports, situated in a context likely to evoke a heightened self-consciousness of one's gendered self, illustrates how gender can affect emotion behavior in an interactive setting. In a similar vein, LaFrance et al.'s (2003) smiling meta-analysis showed that the difference in smiling between genders was greater, with women smiling more and men smiling less, when the participant's interaction partner was in the same age range as the participant, and when the interaction partner was of the other gender. Situations with romantic undertones likely lead people to express emotion in accordance with gendered romantic scripts (e.g., Sanchez, Crocker, & Boike, 2005). Thus, it appears being evaluated generally, and being evaluated in a setting where gender is especially salient, make gender matter.

Motivation Influences the Performance of Gendered Behavior

Emotion behavior is also influenced by motivation besides possible evaluation. When certain incentives are offered for performing a behavior, the effect of gender on these behaviors often disappears. In addition, when an emotion behavior is presented as, or is inferred to be, stereotypically "feminine," there is evidence that men are less motivated to perform the behavior, whereas women may be more motivated to do so.

When incentives are offered for good performance, gender differences in emotion skills (studied thus far) tend to disappear. For example, Ciarrochi, Hynes, and Crittenden (2005) found women had higher emotional awareness scores than men on the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale. However, when men were instructed prior to completing the scale to read a passage that emphasized the importance of emotional awareness and were told their scores on the measure would be compared

to peers, men scored no differently on emotional awareness than women did. Similarly, Klein and Hodges (2001) found women performed better than men on an empathic task in which participants inferred the emotions and thoughts of another. When participants were offered monetary incentives for empathic accuracy, however, gender differences in empathic skill disappeared.

Gender also matters when the behavior one is asked to perform is something thought of as "feminine," or as a skill of women and girls. When emotional behavior is framed in feminine terms, gender differences in emotion behavior are often found. By reframing the wording of instructions to something more neutral, however, differences in the same emotion behavior disappear. For example, Ickes, Gesn, and Graham (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of studies measuring empathic accuracy. They found that although many studies concluded that women had greater emotional skill than men, these findings could be explained by whether or not empathy-related gender role expectations were made salient by the wording of instructions. When instructions asked participants to judge the content of target persons' expressions, and to estimate their own accuracy on this task (making emotional competence a salient feature of the task), women's inferences about the thoughts and feelings of targets were more accurate than men's. When instructions only asked for judgment of the targets' expressions, and not for an estimation of the participant's own accuracy on the task, gender differences in performance were not observed. Ickes et al.'s (2000) conclusion echoes Eisenberg and Lennon's (1983) earlier observation that women perform better than men on empathy-related tasks when participants are aware that empathy is being measured, a performance difference that Eisenberg and Lennon attributed to activation of a gender-role relevant stereotype, analogous to the gender-stereotype-as-heuristic effect reported by Robinson et al. and discussed above.

Not only does neutral wording eliminate gender differences, but taking this idea further, couching emotionality in *masculine* terms or describing it in a masculine context may go as far as to make a particular behavior desirable for men. Indeed, in certain contexts, emotion behaviors may not be interpreted as "emotion" at all. For example, MacArthur and Shields (2015) point out that when it comes to competitive sports, what might be considered "emotional" behavior or as an "overreaction" in women (or men in other contexts) is simply taken in stride:

> ...[S]ports is one context in which open emotional expression is considered normal and appropriate for men. Indeed, the "screaming at the tube, slapping raucous high-fives, indulging in loud emotional outbursts" (Nelson, 1994, p. 4) that seem to accompany sports reveal men's expression of emotion that might be seen as over the top in many other contexts. Similarly, Nelson's (1994) contention that a man may become irritable for an entire day if his team loses illustrates that emotion widely believed to be 'unmanly' is allowed to pass relatively unnoticed in the competitive sports context. (p. 42)

In addition to changing the interpretation of emotions, couching behavior as masculine can also affect trait measures of men's emotion, a finding that might seem counter-intuitive given the supposedly stable nature of such traits. Jones and Heesacker (2012), for example, found that men's self-reports on the Restricted Emotionality subscale of the Gender Role Conflict scale increased when men

watched a humorous video that emphasized stereotypically masculine norms. In other words, when stereotypically masculine standards were made salient, men reported experiencing a narrower range of emotions than when these standards were not highlighted.

The framing of a particular emotion task in masculine or feminine terms can likewise affect how men and women perform on that task. For instance, Koenig and Eagly (2005) found men performed worse on the Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT) when it was framed as a social sensitivity task than when it was framed as a complex information processing task. Men who believed the measure was a test of social sensitivity, a stereotypically feminine skill, reported using more deliberate strategies when responding, which resulted in poorer performance. Similarly, when Horgan and Smith (2006) told participants that the IPT measures judgment skills relevant to military interrogators, women performed worse on the measure than men did. However, men performed worse than women on this same measure when they were told it measured judgment skills relevant to social workers.

Overall, the research discussed in this section shows that gender differences in emotion behavior can be manipulated simply through the instructions of the experimental task. Tasks can be gendered, de-gendered, or other-gendered according to how the task is framed and how the behavior is measured.

Having considered present research on gender and emotion, in the next sections we turn to two research approaches that can move us toward a better psychology of gender and emotion. The first is an intersectional approach that requires thinking critically about *which* women and *which* men the research describes. The second considers the role of power structures in creating and maintaining (and occasionally challenging) gendered stereotypes about emotional behavior. For each, we high-light examples of research that can move the field forward and pose important questions for future research.

Considering Intersectionality

Intersectionality is the idea that social identities are not mutually exclusive, and that lived experiences are based on multiple and intertwined sources of identity (e.g., race, gender, age). Intersectional perspectives also emphasize that these intersecting identities reflect the relational nature of privilege and oppression.[2] Stemming from nineteenth century African American feminist ideas (May, 2015), intersectionality challenges the notion of homogenous gender categories and specifies how one's experience as a woman cannot be defined without taking other identities into account. Intersectionality is particularly useful because it connects social identities

---

[2] Psychology has come to intersectionality more slowly than other disciplines, but in recent years interest has picked up substantial momentum. See for example, Cole (2009), Grzanka (2014), Parent, DeBlaere, and Moradi (2013), and Shields (2008).

to power relations on a structural level. For instance, Crenshaw's (1989) intersectional analysis examined how systems of racism and sexism intersect to influence legal definitions of discrimination that have historically affected lives of Black women and White women differently.

Because intersectional perspectives require looking at multiple facets of social identity, any examination of gender must include consideration of how other facets of social identity may be implicated (or not). Because gender intersects with all other social identities, it is important to provide a rationale for why a particular intersection is being studied or recruited for research participants. When participants are drawn from social identities of relative privilege (e.g., White, heterosexual, male), researchers must be able to explain why studying dominant social identities is relevant to the question, and additionally, the implications their findings have for other intersections. The rationale for including intersections is not simply for the sake of increasing diversity; rather, the intersection(s) studied are chosen to address how systems of oppression and/or privilege operate for the selected intersection(s). For example, if a researcher examines gender by looking at heterosexual White women and men only, she or he should interrogate how White heterosexual privilege affects the performance of gender in the study.

Intersectionality is only now beginning to be used in the study of emotion (e.g., Power, Cole, & Fredrickson, 2010; Smith et al., 2015). For example, in response to research showing that angry White women are perceived as less competent than angry White men (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008), Dicicco (2015) predicted that there were two intersecting race and gender stereotypes that would determine whether angry Black women would receive penalties similar to White women: the Strong Black Woman (SBW) and the Angry Black Woman (ABW). These stereotypes are notably different than those of White women, who, according to stereotypes, should be nice and warm (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Dicicco found that compared to angry White women, angry Black women were perceived as more hostile and aggressive (and marginally more assertive), although there were no differences between the two groups in ratings of competence. Dicicco concluded that differing stereotypes of Black and White women resulted in different outcomes for these two groups of women when expressing anger in the workplace.

According to intersectionality theory, intersections create both advantage and disadvantage. For this reason, Dicicco (2015) included both positive (SBW) and negative (ABW) stereotypes as possible outcomes, and thus did not assume that Black women would automatically be penalized based on negative stereotypes about race and negative stereotypes about gender (an additive approach). In this case, while angry Black women were disadvantaged by the ABW stereotype, their perceived competence did not appear to suffer in that Black and White women were perceived as equally competent. She concludes that it is possible that Black women's invisibility as prototypical women (Sesko & Biernat, 2010) allowed them to escape some backlash for behavior (anger) that violates gender norms of niceness. Thus, as Dicicco (2015) illustrates, unique oppressions and advantages are experienced at each intersection. Therefore, it is important to recognize that

double jeopardy does not always occur for those with two or more typically disadvantaged social identities.

Both quantitative and qualitative intersectional work in gender and emotion will advance the field. As Dicicco's (2015) work illustrates, quantitative and experimental intersectional studies allow us to tease apart which social constructs (e.g., race, gender, class) underlie and magnify the experience of advantage or disadvantage. Qualitative intersectional studies, on the other hand, add depth by examining how intersecting stereotypes inform people's lived experiences. For instance, Wingfield (2010) analyzed the effect of token status on Black professionals' experience of emotion norms and feeling rules in the workplace. In interviews with Black women and men professionals, Wingfield found that emotion labor was stressful for both groups. They were expected to maintain a pleasant exterior despite experiencing racist treatment from colleagues (e.g., isolation, exclusion, racialized comments). She also found that, unlike White workers, participants felt they could not display anger or frustration at all in the workplace, for fear that they would confirm negative racialized stereotypes about anger. Yet, some Black women reported that occasionally they did express anger because it helped them be taken more seriously, in part because they felt Whites feared Black women's anger. From her analysis, it is clear that emotion rules are gendered and racialized, and the participants' experience of these emotion rules demonstrates how racism and sexism are reinstated on a personal level. Thus, both qualitative and quantitative intersectional analyses are necessary to offer a more complete understanding of how gender-emotion stereotypes operate from the perspective of the perceiver and from the perspective of the target.

Intersectional analyses also help us understand that similar results may occur for different intersectional groups via different processes. For example, Harlow (2003) found that Black women professors were perceived as mean and intimidating. At the same time, White women who are not overtly warm or nurturing can also be perceived negatively (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008; Pierce, 1999). Although this idea has not been explicitly tested, anger or coldness is not considered appropriate for Black women or White women, but perhaps for different reasons: White women who are cold or angry are perceived to not conform to appropriate feminine standards, but Black women may be confirming a stereotype that they are hostile or intimidating if they are not overtly warm. Or, as Wingfield's (2010) analysis suggests, White observers may fear Black women's anger and perceive White women's anger as ineffective and irrational emotionality. Thus, depending on one's intersectional position, there may be different explanations for the same outcome of being perceived negatively for expressing anger. Intersectionality therefore requires us to look beyond whether two groups experience the same reality and examine how they experience those realities. Regardless of the mechanism, however, stereotypes about both Black and White women's anger ultimately serve to limit their advancement and maintain gendered and raced hierarchies of power, a point we discuss in more detail in the next section of this chapter.

An intersectionality perspective encourages examination of taken-for-granted assumptions about gender-emotion stereotypes. For example, East Asians are

stereotyped as emotionally inexpressive compared to European Americans. In a study of negotiation contexts, angry East Asian men were perceived to be more threatening and tougher' than angry European American men, which elicited more cooperation from perceivers (Adam & Shirako, 2013). Thus, the stereotype or expectancy violation of an angry East Asian benefitted the expresser (i.e., his anger was taken seriously because it is perceived to be unusual). But the authors did not consider intersectionality and assumed that stereotypes of East Asian men apply to all East Asians. In particular, they did not consider how this expectancy violation might differ for East Asian women, given that White women are typically punished for dominant or assertive behavior (e.g., Rudman, 1998; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). We also do not know if these stereotypes transfer to East Asian American men and women or whether the status of the target affects perceptions. As Adam and Shirako noted, expressions of anger can backfire if the expresser is of high status (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007).

Intersections of identity other than race influence the perception of emotion in others as well, and work in these areas is sorely needed. For example, we can ask how age intersects with gender (and probably race and social class) in how people speak to and label the emotions of elderly people. Elder-speak, the use of patronizing names (e.g., sweetie, dear) and simplified language when communicating with older adults, may reveal how older women's and men's emotions are "managed" by others. For example, people may change the emotional tone and content of their language when communicating with elderly people, ignoring the complexity of older people's emotion due to age bias, and this tendency may be exacerbated by gender, race, and/or social class. Elder-speak reflects a North American culture that values youth over age, but we must also ask how gendered power systems interact with agism to produce experiences specific to aging women and aging men. For example, an issue that may be particularly relevant for aging men is how cultural definitions of masculine emotional self-sufficiency are navigated by older men who may find themselves more socially, physically, or emotionally dependent on others than they had been in middle age or early adulthood. An intersectional framework encourages thinking about within-gender variation and its connection to socio-structural power and status. A related approach that can further our understanding of linkages between gender and emotion is to consider how emotion itself is used to assert power and status.

Considering Power and Status

Yet another direction for research on gender and emotion involves attending to the function of power in the maintenance of gender-emotion stereotypes and considering how socio-structural variables influence both the expression of emotion and how emotion expression is perceived. Although power has been defined in a variety of ways, it is most often conceptualized as the extent to which an individual (or group) is able to provide resources to, or withhold resources from, others

(Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). These resources can be material (e.g., monetary; physical harms or benefits) or social (e.g., knowledge; friendship). Power can be differentiated from status, or the extent to which a person or group is respected or admired by others (regardless of their actual ability to influence the resources or outcomes of others). On a group level, gender differences exist with respect to both power and status. Research shows, for example, that men control more valued resources than women do: men make more money on average (e.g., Oostendorp, 2009), represent a significantly higher proportion of upper level management positions (Catalyst, 2009), and have greater power to cause bodily harm, as evidenced by the fact that women constitute the overwhelming majority of domestic violence victims at the hands of men (García-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2005). In terms of status, research has also shown that men have greater social influence than women: they are more likely to be seen as authorities and have the ability to change the opinions of others (Carli, 1999).

Relationships of power can also be found at many different levels (e.g., individual, group, institutional, and societal), and gendered differences exist at each. Here we discuss power at both the individual and societal level and identify several important questions related to power that we see as important next steps for future research on gender and emotion.

Gender, Emotion, and Power at the Individual Level

Although under-explored in studies on gender and emotion, one fruitful line of investigation is the examination of emotion's role as a tool for maintaining gendered hierarchies of power (i.e., the current societal structure in which men hold more power than women) (Shields, 2002, 2005). Emotion functions as a tool to maintain power when gender-emotion stereotypes (e.g., the idea that women are unsuited for leadership positions due to their excessive emotionality) are used at the individual level to discredit women who seek to transcend prescribed gender roles and claim positions of power that have historically been reserved for men.

Though there is abundant anecdotal evidence of emotion stereotypes being used to keep women from advancing into powerful roles, no experimental studies (to our knowledge) have directly tested this idea. Nevertheless, indirect empirical support for the idea that people may use emotion stereotypes to maintain power hierarchies comes from research on masculinity threat, or the notion that when men's masculinity is called into question, some men will engage in compensatory behaviors to restore a masculine image. Research on the effects of masculinity threat shows that one way in which men's masculinity can be threatened is when they are outperformed by a high-performing woman. Studies on this topic have indicated that in response to this type of threat, men frequently engage in compensatory behaviors designed to boost their masculine image and/or downgrade the status of women (e.g., Dahl, Vescio, & Weaver, 2015; Hitlan, Pryor, Hesson-McInnis, & Olson, 2009).

It is not a stretch, then, to imagine that emotion stereotypes could be used as a compensatory mechanism to maintain the status quo and prevent women from advancing into powerful positions. Indeed, research has shown that evoking emotion stereotypes can have a negative impact on the targeted individual (e.g., Warner, 2007; Zawadzki, Shields, & Haidet, in preparation). One concrete example comes from Hillary Clinton's 2008 Presidential run, during which beliefs about her emotions and emotional state were used to discredit her capabilities as a potential President. Several scholars have documented how emotion (among other aspects of her character and appearance) was used in media coverage of Clinton's campaign to position her as both "too cold" (e.g., references to her as robotic) and "too emotional" (e.g., as out of control when expressing anger), depending on the situation (Carlin & Winfrey, 2009). She was also depicted as emotionally calculating, suspected of manipulating her emotions in order to win favor with voters (Bligh, Merolla, Schroedel, & Gonzalez, 2010). Such policing of women's emotions has been demonstrated in other studies as well. Brescoll and Uhlmann (2008), for example, conducted a study in which participants were shown videotapes of a woman or a man talking about a work incident in which they lost an important account, with targets stating at the end that they were either angry or sad about this result. The authors found that whereas angry male targets were thought to be of higher status than sad male targets, angry female targets were perceived as lower in status than both angry men and sad women. In other words, displaying an emotion associated with status ultimately resulted in backlash for women, making it difficult for them to get ahead in the workplace. As discussed in the section on intersectionality above, the degree and type of such penalties are also dependent on aspects of identity besides gender (e.g., race; Dicicco, 2015), and future work on gender, emotion, and power at the individual level should examine how one's intersectional position may affect the processes by which and the degree to which emotion is used to maintain power hierarchies in the workplace and in other contexts.

Gender, Emotion, and Power at the Societal Level

At the societal level, emotion beliefs and stereotypes may also play a role in maintaining current gender hierarchies. Although one might expect that women's increasing power within a society would mitigate stereotypes about their emotionality, this is not necessarily the case. Emotion stereotypes remain pervasive in North America and other Western cultures, where women's social roles have expanded and they have gained (albeit limited) formal access to many of society's highest positions. Indeed, cross-cultural research suggests that gender differences in self-reported emotionality are largest in Western cultures, where women have more structural power, whereas gender differences in self-reported emotionality are smallest in cultures with more rigid gender role structures (Brody, 1997; Fischer & Manstead, 2000; Singh-Manoux, 2000). Fischer and Manstead (2000), for example, used data from an international emotion database (ISEAR) to examine

the predictive value of several variables on men's and women's self-reported emotion across 37 countries. Contrary to predictions, they found that the Gender Empowerment Index, a measure of how much formal power women hold within a particular country, was associated with greater gender differences in self-reported emotional intensity, emotion duration, and non-verbal expression of emotion. In other words, results indicated that the greatest gender differences in self-reported emotionality were found in cultures where women are the most empowered.

Fischer and Manstead (2000) and others (e.g., Guimond, 2008) have interpreted these cross-cultural findings as being related to the independence versus interdependence of the culture, rather than to Gender Empowerment itself. It may be informative, however, to consider the implications of differing power structures for the gendering of emotion and emotion beliefs. It is possible, for example, that the degree to which women have power in a society influences gendered beliefs about emotion, and that these beliefs in turn influence the way people self-report about their own emotion. Although empirical research is needed to provide a more definitive answer, research discussed above suggests that beliefs about emotion may serve to maintain gendered hierarchies. This function of emotion beliefs would be particularly necessary in societies where women's power is increasing and in which gendered hierarchies are contested (e.g., North America and other Western nations). The use of emotion stereotypes may be less necessary, however, for the purpose of differentiating the status of women and men, in societies where the gendered hierarchy is already well-established through law and formal social structures (e.g., nations with regressive gender laws).

Thinking through such issues leads us to ask questions about the effect that women's increasing power may have in coming years, in countries around the world. Specifically, we wonder whether emotion stereotypes may grow stronger as women advance within a society, and whether negative stereotypes about women's emotionality can be seen as a form of backlash against women's increased empowerment. Given that much of the research cited in this section on power has been conducted using White targets and participants, we also wonder how power hierarchies may be maintained differently (quantitatively or qualitatively) when other aspects of identity interact with gender. These questions are important to consider if we envision a world that supports equality and opportunity for all girls and women.

Concluding Thoughts

Methodological and theoretical innovation is needed to move beyond difference in the study of gender and emotion. As Bowleg (2008) and others have suggested, feminist researchers need to bring information about context, power, intersectionality, and multiple axes of oppression into account at every stage of the research process (e.g., formulating research questions, generating hypotheses, interpreting data). As a best practice, psychologists will also need to conduct more

mixed-methods research to arrive at increasingly complex and nuanced understandings of the phenomenon under investigation. As journal publication becomes increasingly competitive, requiring replicability and sophisticated statistical analyses, the research standard should also change to require more thoughtful considerations of who is being studied, and the mechanisms that underlie the effect. In this chapter, we have focused on the role of intersectionality (attending to who is being studied) and status/power (attending to what is driving the effect). We could have devoted an entire additional chapter to considering how our analysis fits (and where it does not) with the study of gender in the burgeoning fields of affective neuroscience, hormones and emotion, and emotion and health, but we will leave that for another day. Our overarching goal in this chapter has been to encourage psychologists to explore the interconnection of gender and emotion with the powerful theoretical and analytic tools of feminist studies.

References

Adam, H., & Shirako, A. (2013). Not all anger is created equal: The impact of the expresser's culture on the social effects of anger in negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 98*, 785–798. doi:10.1037/a0032387.

Arnold, M. B. (1960). *Emotion and personality*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Barnett, R. C., & Rivers, C. (2004). Men are from earth, and so are women. *It's faulty research that sets them apart. Chronicle of Higher Education, 51*, B11–B13.

Barrett, L. F., Robin, L., Pietromonaco, P. R., & Eyssell, K. M. (1998). Are women the "more emotional" sex? Evidence from emotional experiences in social context. *Cognition & Emotion, 12*, 555–578. doi:10.1080/026999398379565.

Blake, A., & O'Keefe, E. (2014, April 6). Hayden suggests Feinstein too 'emotional' about CIA interrogation techniques. *The Washington Post*.Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/04/06/hayden-feinstein-too-emotional-about-cia-interrogation-techniques/

Bligh, M., Merolla, J., Schroedel, J. R., & Gonzalez, R. (2010). Finding her voice: Hillary Clinton's rhetoric in the 2008 presidential campaign. *Women's Studies, 39*, 823–850. doi:10.1080/00497878.2010.513316.

Bowleg, L. (2008). When Black+ lesbian+ woman≠ Black lesbian woman: The methodological challenges of qualitative and quantitative intersectionality research. *Sex Roles, 59*, 312–325. doi:10.1007/s11199-008-9400-z.

Brescoll, V. L., & Uhlmann, E. L. (2008). Can an angry woman get ahead? Status conferral, gender, and expression of emotion in the workplace. *Psychological Science, 19*, 268–275. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02079.x.

Brody, L. R. (1997). Gender and emotion: Beyond stereotypes. *Journal of Social Issues, 53*, 369–394. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00022.

Brody, L. R., & Hall, J. A. (2010). Gender, emotion, and socialization. In J. C. Chrisler & D. R. McCreary (Eds.), *Handbook of gender research in psychology* (pp. 429–454). New York, NY: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-1465-1_21.

Carli, L. L. (1999). Gender, interpersonal power, and social influence. *Journal of Social Issues, 55*, 81–99. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00106.

Carlin, D. B., & Winfrey, K. L. (2009). Have you come a long way, baby? Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and sexism in 2008 campaign coverage. *Communication Studies, 60*, 326–343. doi:10.1080/10510970903109904.

Catalyst. (2009). *2009 Catalyst census: Fortune 500 women executive officers and top earners*. New York, NY: Catalyst.

Ciarrochi, J., Hynes, K., & Crittenden, N. (2005). Can men do better if they try harder: Sex and motivational effects on emotional awareness. *Cognition & Emotion, 19*, 133–141. doi:10.1080/02699930441000102.

Cole, E. R. (2009). Intersectionality and research in psychology. *American Psychologist, 64*, 170–180. doi:10.1037/a0014564.

Crawford, M. (2011). *Transformations: Women, gender, & psychology* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. *U. Chi. Legal F., 139*.

Dahl, J. L., Vescio, T. K., & Weaver, K. S. (2015). How threats to masculinity sequentially cause public discomfort, anger and ideological dominance over women. *Social Psychology, 46*, 242–254. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000248.

Deaux, K., & Major, B. (1987). Putting gender into context: An interactive model of gender-related behavior. *Psychological Review, 94*, 369–389. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.94.3.369.

Dicicco, E. C. (2015). [Hostile or agentic? Intersecting race/gender stereotypes and the perception of women's anger in the workplace]. Unpublished raw data.

Eagly, A. H. (1987). Reporting sex differences. *American Psychologist, 42*, 756–757. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.42.7.756.

Eisenberg, N., & Lennon, R. (1983). Sex differences in empathy and related capacities. *Psychological Bulletin, 94*, 100–131. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.94.1.100.

Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1975). *Pictures of facial affect*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Fischer, A. H. (1993). Sex differences in emotionality: Fact or stereotype? *Feminism & Psychology, 3*, 303–318. doi:10.1177/0959353593033002.

Fischer, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2000). The relation between gender and emotion in different cultures. In A. H. Fischer (Ed.), *Gender and emotion: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 71–94). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

García-Moreno, C., Jansen, H. A., Ellsberg, M., Heise, L., & Watts, C. (2005). *WHO multi-country study on women's health and domestic violence against women: Initial results on prevalence, health outcomes and women's responses*. Geneva: World Health Organization.

Grossman, M., & Wood, W. (1993). Sex differences in intensity of emotional experience: A social role interpretation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*, 1010–1022. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.5.1010.

Grzanka, P. R. (Ed.). (2014). *Intersectionality: A foundations and frontiers reader*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Guimond, S. (2008). Psychological similarities and differences between women and men across cultures. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2*, 494–510. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00036.x.

Hare-Mustin, R. T., & Marecek, J. (1988). The meaning of difference: Gender theory, postmodernism, and psychology. *American Psychologist, 43*, 455–464. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.43.6.455.

Harlow, R. (2003). "Race doesn't matter, but . . .": The effect of race on professors' experiences and emotion management in the undergraduate college classroom. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 66*, 348–63. doi:10.2307/1519834.

Hitlan, R. T., Pryor, J. B., Hesson-McInnis, M. S., & Olson, M. (2009). Antecedents of gender harassment: An analysis of person and situation factors. *Sex Roles, 61*, 794–807. doi:10.1007/s11199-009-9689-2.

Horgan, T. G., & Smith, J. L. (2006). Interpersonal reasons for interpersonal perceptions: Gender-incongruent purpose goals and nonverbal judgment accuracy. *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 30*, 127–140. doi:10.1007/s10919-006-0012-4.

Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. *American Psychologist, 60*, 581–592. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.60.6.581.

Ickes, W., Gesn, P. R., & Graham, T. (2000). Gender differences in empathic accuracy: Differential ability or differential motivation? *Personal Relationships, 7*, 95–109. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6811.2000.tb00006.x.

Izard, C. E. (1971). *The face of emotion*. East Norwalk, CT: Appleton.

Jones, K. D., & Heesacker, M. (2012). Addressing the situation: Some evidence for the significance of microcontexts with the gender role conflict construct. *Psychology of Men & Masculinity, 13*, 294–307. doi:10.1037/a0025797.

Keltner, D., & Gross, J. J. (1999). Functional accounts of emotions. *Cognition & Emotion, 13*, 467–480. doi:10.1080/026999399379140.

Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. *Psychological Review, 110*, 265–284. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265.

Klein, K. J. K., & Hodges, S. D. (2001). Gender differences, motivation, and empathic accuracy: When it pays to understand. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27*, 720–730. doi:10.1177/0146167201276007.

Koenig, A. M., & Eagly, A. H. (2005). Stereotype threat in men on a test of social sensitivity. *Sex Roles, 52*, 489–496. doi:10.1007/s11199-005-3714-x.

LaFrance, M., & Banaji, M. (1992). Toward a reconsideration of the gender-emotion relationship. *Emotion and Social Behavior, 14*, 178–201.

LaFrance, M., Hecht, M. A., & Paluck, E. L. (2003). The contingent smile: A meta-analysis of sex differences in smiling. *Psychological Bulletin, 129*, 305–334. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.2.305.

Lott, B. (1997). The personal and social correlates of a gender difference ideology. *Journal of Social Issues, 53*, 279–297. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00018.

MacArthur, H. J., & Shields, S. A. (2015). There's no crying in baseball, or is there? Male athletes, tears, and masculinity in North America. *Emotion Review, 7*, 39–46. doi:10.1177/1754073914544476.

Magnusson, E., & Marecek, J. (2012). *Gender and culture in psychology: Theories and practices*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

May, V. M. (2015). *Pursuing intersectionality, unsettling dominant imaginaries*. New York, NY: Routledge.

McFarland, C., Ross, M., & DeCourville, N. (1989). Women's theories of menstruation and biases in recall of menstrual symptoms. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*, 522–531.

Nelson, M. B. (1994). *The stronger women get, the more men love football: Sexism and the American culture of sports*. New York, NY: HarcourtBrace.

Oatley, K., & Duncan, E. (1994). The experience of emotions in everyday life. *Cognition & Emotion, 8*, 369–381. doi:10.1080/02699939408408947.

Oostendorp, R. H. (2009). Globalization and the gender wage gap. *World Bank Economic Review, 23*, 141–161. doi:10.1093/wber/lhn022.

Parent, M. C., DeBlaere, C., & Moradi, B. (2013). Approaches to research on intersectionality: Perspectives on gender, LGBT, and racial/ethnic identities [Special issue]. *Sex Roles, 68*, 639–645. doi:10.1007/s11199-013-0283-2.

Pierce, J. (1999). Emotional labor among paralegals. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 561*, 127–42. doi:10.1177/0002716299561001009.

Plutchik, R., & Kellerman, H. (Eds.). (1980). *Emotion: Theory, research and experience* (Theories of emotion, Vol. 1). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Power, C. A., Cole, E. R., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2010). Poor women and the expression of shame and anger: The price of breaking social class feeling rules. *Feminism & Psychology, 21*, 179–197.0959353510384125.

Prentice, D. A., & Carranza, E. (2002). What women and men should be, shouldn't be, are allowed to be, and don't have to be: The contents of prescriptive gender stereotypes. *Psychology of Women Quarterly, 26*, 269–281. doi:10.1111/1471-6402.t01-1-00066.

Robinson, M. D., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Belief and feeling: Evidence for an accessibility model of emotional self-report. *Psychological Bulletin, 128*, 934–960. doi:10.1037//0033-2909.128.6. 934.

Robinson, M. D., Johnson, J. T., & Shields, S. A. (1998). The gender heuristic and the database: Factors affecting the perception of gender-related differences in the experience and display of emotions. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 20*, 206–219. doi:10.1207/ 15324839851036688.

Rudman, L. A. (1998). Self-promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and benefits of counterstereotypical impression management. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 629–645. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.629.

Rudman, L. A., Moss-Racusin, C. A., Phelan, J. E., & Nauts, S. (2012). Status incongruity and backlash effects: Defending the gender hierarchy motivates the prejudice against female leaders. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48*, 165–179. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011. 10.008.

Saarni, C., Campos, J. J., Camras, L. A., & Witherington, D. (2006). Emotional development: Action, communication, and understanding. *Handbook of child psychology:* (6th ed.) *Vol. 3, social, emotional, and personality development* (pp. 226-299). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Sanchez, D. T., Crocker, J., & Boike, K. R. (2005). Doing gender in the bedroom: Investing in gender norms and the sexual experience. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31*, 1445–1455. doi:10.1177/0146167205277333.

Sesko, A. K., & Biernat, M. (2010). Prototypes of race and gender: The invisibility of Black women. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46*, 356–360. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.10. 016.

Shields, S. A. (1991). Gender in the psychology of emotion: A selective research review. *International Review of Studies on Emotion, 1*, 227–245.

Shields, S. A. (2002). *Speaking from the heart: Gender and the social meaning of emotion*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Shields, S. A. (2005). The politics of emotion in everyday life:" Appropriate" emotion and claims on identity. *Review of General Psychology, 9*, 3–15. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.9.1.3.

Shields, S. A. (2008). Gender: An intersectionality perspective [Special issue]. *Sex Roles, 59*, 301–311. doi:10.1007/s11199-008-9501-8.

Shields, S. A. (2013). Gender and emotion what we think we know, what we need to know, and why it matters. *Psychology of Women Quarterly, 37*, 423–435. doi:10.1177/ 0361684313502312.

Singh-Manoux, A. (2000). Culture and gender issues in adolescence: Evidence from studies on emotion. *Psicothema, 12*, 93–100.

Smith, J. S., LaFrance, M., & Dovidio, J. F. (2015). Categorising intersectional targets: An "either/ and" approach to race-and gender-emotion congruity. *Cognition and Emotion*, 1-15. doi:10. 1080/02699931.2015.1081875.

Unger, R. K. (2010). Leave no text behind: Teaching the psychology of women during the emergence of second wave feminism. *Sex Roles, 62*, 153–158. doi:10.1007/s11199-009-9740-3.

Van Kleef, G. A. (2009). How emotions regulate social life the emotions as social information (EASI) model. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18*, 184–188. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01633.x.

Van Kleef, G. A., & Côté, S. (2007). Expressing anger in conflict: When it helps and when it hurts. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 92*, 1557–1559. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.6.1557.

Warner, L. R. (2007). *Delegitimization and Women's Perceived Overemotionality: "Don't Be So Emotional!"*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. The Pennsylvania State University.

West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. *Gender & Society, 1*, 125–151. doi:10.1177/ 0891243287001002002.

Wingfield, A. H. (2010). Are some emotions marked "Whites only"? Radicalized feeling rules in professional workplaces. *Social Problem, 57*, 251–268. doi:10.1525/sp.2010.57.2.25.

Yoder, J. D., & Kahn, A. S. (2003). Making gender comparisons more meaningful: A call for more attention to social context. *Psychology of Women Quarterly, 27*, 281–290. doi:10.1111/1471-6402.00108.

Zawadzki, M. J., Shields, S. A., & Haidet, P. M. Beliefs about patient emotion attenuates coronary artery disease diagnosis (in preparation).